# IRAN'S GLOBAL POWER FORM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF IRAN AND TURKEY ALONG WITH THE GEOPOLITICAL AXIS OF ARABIC SPRING

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# **ABSTRACT**

After the 1990, it is very important that in the immediate vicinity of the geopolitical changes that have occurred in Turkey. The first changes is Iran and Iraq on the edge. Especially the Turkey-Iran and Iraq, all kinds of geopolitical developments occurring in the triple border, to a critical value. Because the triple border Iran and Iraq by Turkey as a safety check. For this reason, has become the center of all kinds of illegal developments. Iran, conducts a policy of asymmetric after 1990, in the Caucasus, and the Middle East and Central Asia geography.

This policy from time to time an anti-U.S. hostility toward the West and exacerbate. The attitude of the West and the United States due to the foreign policy of Turkey's neighbor Iran rather problematic periods. Because the entire Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey's policies on Iran, which is a pretty effective. For this reason, Iran, Turkey is a country that needs to be analyzed by far the best.

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# Introduction

The Arab Spring was initiated by an activist who burned himself in Tunisia four years ago and expanded all of North Africa like a torch that caught alight. Penetrated in Middle East within a very short period of time and turned into a civil war that caused great damage to Syria. The expectation at the time was a replacement of the Nusayri regime, which was led by Esad, with a Sunni regime that would be in peace with the western world. However, this didn't happen. Until today, Bessar Esad has protected the regime at the expense of an atrocity of his people and a possible collapse of his country (Sassoon, 2012). Questions like; "How did he protect the regime?", "why was he not taken down?" and "what next?" are the most important questions of today that require the correct approach to give answers. For this, Iran - perhaps the most important country that stood behind Esad's resistance must be studied from the perspectives of demographic, geographical, political, economic and ethnical distributions. Identification of Iran's strengths and weaknesses that are buried within the geopolitical substances plays a critical role in estimating the future.

The triple border located on the South East coast of Turkey which is between Iran, Iraq and Turkey is crucial for Iranian geopolitical aspect. From a border protection perspective, this region cannot be constrained by any countries except for Turkey. The population located between these three borders has either relative bonds or hatred. The area covered by these three borders has high rates of terrorism, human and drug traffic. Local community carries out a small tribe type life style in a territorial structure and could not appropriate a national identification due to the high levels of strain executed by the Iranian and Iraqi political approach. Throughout the history, one has provoked the other against this group and has avoided the community to oversee the differences introduced by two individual cultures.

To be able to understand the area in question, its local people and geographical structure better, a journey from the town of Erbil of Northern Iraq is required for observation. Roads that stretch to the North are in a terrible condition once Erbil is left behind. A walk on the terrain shows small villages that are very small in size with 5 to 10 houses and a few barns. Here, the majority of the locals do speak Turkish but use Kurdish that carries Arabic and Farsi influences. People

that consider themselves as neither Iraqi nor Iranian nor Turkish usually introduce themselves within the Kurdish tribe. The elder people in the area speak about the Saddam era, especially about the destructive effects of the MI-24 military helicopters that he purchased from the Russians. Towards Turkey, to the West – East direction, Lolan River welcomes you with a strong flow during both summer and winter months. Once the snow melts in spring, logs and rocks that fall into the river often obstruct horse and human traffic. It is a challenge to pass the river between November and August due to the 100 km stretch of the river. The river starts running from Derecik, which is 60 km West of Semdinli and stretches to the East. This region, named Life Valley, has the lowest altitude and is the flattest ground in Northern Iraq. (Durgean Region) Ari Region is further along this line and is used as a secret camp by PKK which is in battle with Turkey. Karadag that stretches from Turkey to Iraq divides Hakurk Valley, the biggest hiding spot of PKK, in to two. When walked for 6 hours from Erbil, the dirt road intersects with Lolan River and gives the options of East and West directions. The Western direction reaches to the Iraq – Turkey path and provides an exit on dirt roads until it reaches to Syria. The Eastern direction is more complicated. Parallel to the river, towards East, there are plenty of small tribes without a name. Locals in this area consist of Kurdish families however they are closer to Iranian people. This route reaches to the triple border between Turkey – Iran and Iraq.

These regions right across from Turkey are completely uncontrolled and unsafe. The field conditions get rougher and roads get wide enough for a horse and pedestrian to pass when proceeded to the intersection point of this triple border. Haci Bey River is located at the intersection point of this triple border. Walking further North of this location is impossible due to the challenging terrain conditions. Thus, extending to the North leaving Turkey on the West and Iran on the East are the Dalamper and Armutlu mountains. Both mountains are in a wide and rough terrain conditions, hence takes at least 2 to 3 days to be able pass over both of them. On the other hand, there is not a direct path that allows for transportation and finding a new path in replacement of the ones that disappear in time is often required. These rough and steep mountains allow for a secret passage from Iran to Iraq, through Turkey, resulting with high smuggling rates. To be able to travel to Iran from right next to the Turkish border, one would need to take the paths around these mountains.

These passages go through deep valleys with condense tree population hiding them. Each passage has a heavy illegal activity history; especially smuggling drugs through Turkey to Europe, alcoholic beverages (mostly beer) as well as prostitution traffic from Iran to Iraq. These paths have been providing high profit over the years. The Eastern end of Dalamper Mountain leads to a large plateau in Iranian soils. One end of the plateau has the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' patrol castles and the other end has Turkey's Area Defense and border station houses. This path is never used during daylight as all travelers get arrested and questioned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Those who try to runaway get shot by long range weapons. Hence, this path is more commonly used during night time. This path leads to the East of Armutlu Mountains, just inside the Turkish border. Moving further East extends to Semdinli region through the village of "Magara Onu". This is a Turkish origin village; however the roots of its people extend to Iran. Following a break, an hour of a walk will arrive to Iran's border town – Urumiye. This small Shii town mostly consists of Iranian Kurds. In spite of the official Farsi language, locals use Kurdish that is mainly influenced by Farsi. Rather than being a border town, Urumiye is more of a meeting spot for smugglers where they wait for the right time to make their move. After 1990, with the increase in transactions over the border, the village has grown into a city that became crucial in passing over to Iraq (Hassan, 2013).

It is possible to conclude some demographic findings from this journey on the path of Erbil – Semdinli – Urumiye. The first outcome is that the Iran – Iraq portion of the path is completely uncontrolled. The main reasons for this are insufficient authority of the government and partial commercial benefit to Iraq and Iran. The second is the existing community in the area within a cycle of family bonds. The local people in the area mainly have Kurdish roots. However, there are significant differences amongst them. In spite of the fact that their mother language is Kurdish, unique dialects that even cause defects in daily communication are used. The religious context is even more complicated. The entire region sustains Muslim belief with Sunni and Shia separation. Those who live in small territories avoid and consider each other as a potential threat. In general, local accommodation consists of shelters and natural water reserves within the area are used. Food is cooked on floor stoves and fundamental source of cuisine covers milk, local cheese and homemade bread ( Hassan, 2013).

The travel path of Erbil – Semdinli – Urumiye line has always been an important destination. This region is more commonly accommodated by Kurds

where the internal conflicts have inclined over the years and carried great importance with the approach that governments followed.(Akhbari, 2009) The Kurdish people of Iraq who followed KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party), which was found by Mesut Barzani, had internal conflicts in 1970s and some of the members chose to leave KDP and be a part of KYP (Kurdistan Nationalists Union) found by Celal Talabani. Following this change, conflicts between two groups have arisen while both Iran and Iraq were involved.

In 1988, when Saddam conducted the Halepce Massacre, KYP requested Iran to accept the party as a refuge. Until the Gulf War, KYP proceeded with terrorist activities in Iraq with Iranian support while KDP initiated similar activities in Iran with the support of Iraq. During this time, the Erbil – Semdinli - Urumiye line was the most critical path of transportation for the terrorists. In 1984, PKK, led by Abdullah Ocalan, joined this group to conduct operations against Turkey. The ability of Turkey to sustain cooperation with the United States of America and to be able to execute operations beyond the border have disturbed KDP, located in Iraq and thus did not accept PKK to be positioned on Iraqi lands. Following this, PKK has moved their command officials to the Beka Valley in Syria. Conditions have changed after 1990. KYP in Iran has moved to Iraq and came to agreement with KDP in the form of ownership of an Independent Northern Iraqi Kurdish formation. Following this, the only Kurdish organization that conducted illegal activities was PKK. PKK has continued its actions against Turkey and kept on gaining covered funds from KDP. The uncontrolled areas that are in between Northern part of Erbil and Urumiye were used against the Turkish military forces and civilian units.

When the connections of this path with Syria are considered, the discomfort that Iran feels can be justified. Because this path also forms a base for the discriminated thought of the Arabic Spring that extends to Iran. There are four countries that have Kurdish citizens, including Syria. Only the ones in Turkey hold a Turkish identification card and a small group that is influenced by the activities in Iraq carries the Kurdish nationalism into an ideological level. However, the independent ruling in Iraq and a new independent ruling to be born in Syria with Esad's collapse may alter the Middle Eastern geography. This also has the power of provoking the 4 million Kurdish citizens located in Iran against the Iranian government. This is a worst case scenario for Iran. To avoid this scenario, Iran must follow an asymmetric, international political approach to protect its geopolitical structure that would allow for adaptation ability to a

variable nature. The most important reason for this move is to contain the Arabic Spring within Syria and to minimize its effects in their own lands. Thus considering the weaknesses of the Iranian border in the content of future analysis is crucial. Hence this paper targets the importance of the Iranian geopolitics from Turkey's point of view and also aims to define the identification of Iranian action impacts on Turkey. Geopolitics of Iran from Turkey's Point of View The most positive stage of the Iran – Turkey relations with ups and downs was the Ataturk era. During this timeframe, Iranian emperor Pehlevi took the modern Turkey shaped by Ataturk as a model (Palabiyik, 2010).

This reinforced the relationship between the two countries and Sadabat Pact, constructed by Ataturk, was developed with regional partnership. However the close relationship between two countries did not last too long. With Ataturk's pass away, Second World War and following events caused Iran to be shaped around an Islamic Republic based on Shia ideology while Turkey followed a Sunni, secular structure.6 From this time on, Turkey's secular, modern status in Western world has been considered as a threat to the Iranian regime. Iran's international affair policy was constructed with these influences after 1990 (Akdevelioğlu, 2004). During the Cold War era, Iran has been a neighbor of the strong RSSU. This has restricted Iran's movement and caused Iran to sustain a static condition. With the end of RSSU invasion over a large portion of the Eurasian continent, Iran has gained the advantage of proceeding with its delayed international policy.8 Iran's asymmetric nature that is reflected with its international policy through Kafka and Middle East is based on Iran's geographical structure. Iran has access to one of the two greatest energy resources of the world and shares a border with the second. On the other hand, with direct exit to Trans Kafka and Middle East, owning the Eastern shores of Gulf of Basra which is the most critical port for distributing the Middle Eastern oil, Iran holds an effective geopolitical role (Şahin, 2006).

# **Geopolitical Configurations**

From a narrow perspective, Iran shares borders with 6 countries; Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia on the West, with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan on the East. This border system results with some advantages and disadvantages. From an advantage point of view the existing borders doesn't allow for Iran to be fully surrounded or for a full embargo to be applied.

Also, Iran is a very difficult country to be invaded with its wide stretch of geography. On the other hand, similar to the condition on Iran – Iraq and Turkish triple border; the uncontrolled region on Afghan and Pakistan borders helps Iran. With active illegal activities, surrounding countries get damaged while Iran protects its bumper identity by this illegal and secure region. Thus, uncontrolled regions as such are a part of the Iranian security system. With these in mind, there are important disadvantages of Iran's border system. The most important is the demographic impact of Iran's neighbor countries. Iran contains various ethnic groups that protect variations. These various groups survive under Iran's continuous pressure and control. The ethnical structure is the soft side of Iran. 46% of the population (34,500,000) is Farsi, 33% (24,750,000) Azeri, 7% (5,250,000) Kurdish, 2% (1,500,000) Beluci, 3% (2,250,000) Arabic, 4% (3,000,000) Glek, 2% (1,500,000) Lur and 3% (2,250,000) is Turkish/Turkmen (Saraçli,2008). While prior to the collapse of RRSU these variances did not hold any importance, with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan calling their independence after 1900, escalation of global micronationalism, Kurdish groups uniting in Northern Iraq after the Gulf war in Iraq caused Iran to hold concerns against a potential triggering impact of the Kurdish groups in Iran.(Ahmadi,2012) On the other hand, the energy sources hold a great value in Iran's geopolitics. Iran was faced with two important issues in this area and determined some goals to achieve for turning these problems into its own advantage in order to become a continent leader in energy resources. The first is executing all the precautions to fully control the energy flow of Middle East. Iraq Shiis on the southern region was directed against this goal.

Therefore, continuous Shii and Sunni conflicts in Iraq as well as word of war between the western countries with the US support causes issues. This conflict reflects crucial concerns to Turkey. Due to Turkey's common point of stand with its western alliances and the United States of America, as well as the shared border with Iran, these negative regional developments keep Turkey in alert. This region plays the role of a bumper area for the interactions with United States through Middle East. Even that there is not proof, Iran carries activities against the western thought on the south with Basra through this line. On the West end, supports the Syrian government and challenges Israel through Lebanon. The most important cause of these activities has been to drawn the USA whose ultimate goal is to lead an undisturbed continuous flow of the Arabic oil, in the issues of Middle East (Gorce, 2003).

Another item that brings importance for the energy policies to be diverted into international policies is the Caspian basin. Iran has been a partner with the RSSU in a limited frame through the Cold War. (Faroughy, 1992) After the collapse of the RSSU, Iran has been in continuous battle with four neighbor countries with in the basin. Caspian's status of being a lake or a sea is a problem for Iran. Iran insists on keeping Caspian in a "sea status" and shares similar point of view with the Russian Federation. With the sea status, Iran will be put in a free region and will aid carrying oil and gas activities in the area. The process will, however, take time. Especially Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan insists on the "lake status" (Terzioğlu,2008) Hence, Iran's Middle East policy holds an ultimate variable nature. For the countries that share borders with Caspian to be in conduct with western nations, specifically with the United States, for a common purpose of drilling for oil and gas is an undesired scenario for Iran. Therefore, Iran continues to lead a preventive status in the region especially via constant conflict with the United States of America using chaos. (Paucot, 1987) Turkey sustains the majority of its energy demand from the resources found in Caspian to feed its inclining economy. The primary energy resource for Turkey is Iran since the gas and oil cannot be imported in desired amounts or cost from Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. This relationship holds danger as Turkey supports the US and Western Civilization. Turkey prefers Iran to sustain a regional force rather than a global one. Iran's weakness in geocultural scale is based on its demographics. Iran contains three important groups that cause internal conflict. The first is the Iranian Azerbaijanis. After the RSSU, the northern borders that are occupied by the Iranian Azerbaijanis caused Iran to proceed with active policies in Caucasian region (Akdevelioğlu, 2004).

Iran has claimed that Azerbaijan's southern region consists of historical Iranian lands that have been invaded by Russia and requested Azerbaijan to return these lands (Yeşilot ,2008). For a long time, Armenia has been protected by Iran against Azerbaijan (Akdevelioğlu, 2004). As part of USA's Caucasian policy, Turkey has supported Azerbaijan and developed the relationship between the United States, Turkey and Azerbaijan. This relationship today has formed a mid-scale equilibrium in Caucasian region, which specifically has benefits for Turkey. Iran applies condensed pressure policy on regions of Azerbaijani population. The other group is Beluci minorities that live on the Afghan – Pakistani border. The pressure policy executed by Iran reaches to the extent of assimilation in this region. After 1990, Iran had various political issues as a result of Pakistanis provocation of Belucies. However, due to the incoherent

religious concept and ethnical properties, Sunni and Shia separation, Pakistan could not take any actions that would cause trouble to Iran (Ahmad, 2009).

The main, minority group that caused Arabic Spring to be effective in Syria are the Kurds. The Kurdish population in Iran following the Second World War was significantly high. With the power of population, weaknesses of the Shah regime and with the help of RSSU support, an "Unofficial Kurdish Country" was found in 1946, in northern Iran (Ozcan, 2006). Shortly after, the RSSU has cut of its support in this formation and the Shah regime has dispatched the Kurd system. As a result, Kurds have moved to RSSU and Iraq, while some stayed in Iran. Today, Iran – Turkey border and the north extension hold 4.5 million Iranian Kurds. This corresponds to 5% of the overall population. Iran's main concern today; revolves around the formation of an independent Kurdish population in Iraq, a potential for an independent Kurdish status in Syria following the collapse of Esad era and the interactions with Turkey. This leads to a desire for Iran to keep the triple border as a bumper region to avoid an apparent impact to its lands that would be result of a nationalist move in micro scales. Turkey differs from Iran in the aspect of these policies. Turkey correlates the end of internal war in Syria with the collapse of the Esad regime and cooperates with the United States in this scope. However, Iran and Turkey sustain completely different political approaches. Therefore, with their regional instability, a scenario where Kurds gain independence on the border of four countries would do most of the damage to Iran and Turkey. Due to Turkey's cooperation with the United States of America and the West in the Middle East revolution, regional Kurdish structure is constrained by a significant paradox.

Iran, Moving from Regional to Continental Form of Power Eurasia politics of Iran had been progressed at three stages after 1990's. The major cause of this situation originates from asymmetric uncertainty created by USSR demolition (Erdoğdu, 2008). With this new era, Iran became neighbor with the newly established countries located at Caucasia and Mid-Asia. Iranian foreign politics shaped as invasive religious (imperialist) strategies and Iran approached these countries with religious pressure politics since all countries but Armenia were Muslims (Turan,2011). But at this time frame, Iran did not consider the political perspectives of newly established countries representatives who preferred to stay away from Islamic pressure and took Western countries as raw models. For example, Iran support was kindly appreciated by Azerbaijan

initially for Nagorno-Karabakh problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia but refused as soon as Iranian real purpose, Shite propaganda, were understood.(Yavuz,2006).

Similar examples were observed at mid-Asia, especially Uzbek-Kirgiz and Kazak government's efforts against Taliban, El Kaide, and Uzbek Islamic Movement. Iran never hesitated its support to radical groups because Iran aims to support Muslim Turkish leaders on these newly established countries who may coordinate and cooperate with Iranian politics. For example, Iran organized couple assassinations to Islam Kerimov at different times and supported Erg Political Party which was close to Iranian political approaches. Further, Iran supported organizations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir at Kazakhstan and played an essential role to gather them and make these organizations work mutually (Ülkü, 2002).

But all these projects were failed. At this time, USA, Turkey, and Russian federation which act as successor of USSR intervene these countries at different situations but the leaders of these countries survived somehow. As a result, Iran experienced the biggest loss due to its politics at this era. Iran not only lost support of the countries which cooperates with itself due to religious based politics but also could not prevented these countries integration with Western countries. Therefore, Shite based invasive foreign politics was a great disappointment for Iran. Turkey has planned to revive Turkish World at Caucasus and Mid-Asia located at Turkish-China strategic region with a slogan of "Integrating Turkish World from Atlantic to Great China Wall". In this scope, Turkish foreign policy was shaped over cultural plans and was developed on these cultural politics. However, this policy was interrupted since the two routes to Turkish-China geopolitics line passes over Armenia and Iran. prevent Turkish domination over Caucasus, Armenia aimed to develop its relationship with Russian Federation and Iran. A consensus was made on this relationship and further, Iran involvement aimed to repulse Azerbaijanis reside in Iran from their homeland. Thus, two different alliance formed between Turkey-Azerbaijan-USA and Iran-Armenia-Russia at Caucasus and power segregation was developed on this strategy (Lévesque, 2010).

The worse scenario for Iran is the presence of Turkish World at Mid-Asia supported by Western countries. Therefore, Iran developed two strategy: The first one is against Turkey. Iran propagated several alternative scenarios at this time frame to disrupt physical connection between Turkey and Mid-Asia. Some

of the Iran scenarios were; protection of uncontrolled regions at Turkish-Iran-Iraq triple border, supporting illegal organization of PKK, supporting armed assaults, and coordinate with illegal radical groups to establish Shite perception. Eventually, these scenarios were successful and because Turkey had to deal with the outcomes and crisis, Turkey did not find enough opportunity to follow an active policy at Mid-Asia. The second one was change of Iran geopolitical perception; Iran realized that Shite invasion based politics were unsuccessful and did not bring any profit at all. Therefore, Iran changed its policy totally and switched to an economy based foreign politics in Mid-Asia (Şahin,2006).

This economy based politics over these countries consist of providing lowpriced energy sources conveniently, providing transportation on warm waters, increasing the volume of trade, and supporting industrial investments. politic approach made Iran successful but Turkey ineffective at Mid-Asia and made these Turkish originated countries tightly coordinated with Iran Then, Shanghai Pact established at 1996 and renamed as (Bailes, 2007). Shanghai Cooperation Organization at 2006 accepted Iran as observer member (Cohen, 1996). This can be attributed to success of Iran's economy based politics. The challenge at Eurasia at 2001 started by USA operation on Afghanistan as an initial movement. USA operation against Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its supporter Taliban was successful and Western-Mid Asia countries backed up this operation by both political and military support (Clements, 2003). This created concerns on Iran since it is surrounded by USA at eastern side and this become a big threat for Iran's unity (Mansfield, 2012). The second movement performed by USA at 2003 and USA ended Saddam regime in Iraq. Iran foresee this as invasion from both east and west and the next US operation will be on Iran after that of Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, Iran took precautions against this potential operation and started indirect preventions against USA/Western countries to disrupt their policies on Iran's interest regions. Although supporters of USA and Western countries made a huge effort in Afghanistan and Iraq at 2001-2006 to form a consensus regime parallel with Western countries regarding political and military support, the desired success was a disappointment.

As a result, flexible political alterations were observed. This provided Iran an opportunity to eliminate potential invasion and Iran started more aggressive foreign politics. There is an important reason for this act. Power challenge started by 2001 was resulted on favor of Iran. Further, USA preferred to keep its

military in Afghanistan for a short time and dictate a US pro-government on behalf of Taliban but troubled against US public for their military and economic loss. Further, US could not control the region as well.

ISAF forces formed from NATO members with US support has encountered with the same problem and NATO member decided to stop the operation to prevent global radical terrorism attack on Europe. All these events outcomes were evaluated as "no operation against Iran would be executed". On the other hand, USA operation on Iraq to depose Saddam was the most beneficial for Iran. Because Iran was saved from an enemy and further, USA gave big loss to this country. In terms of politics, Iran created a region at its authority at the southern part of Basra by influencing the population with Shiite propaganda (Sick, 2012)

Iran gave important support to this propaganda. Iran believed that Shiites who has been dominated by Sunnis by more than a thousand years, captured an opportunity over Sunnis first time ever to be the leader of Islamic world (Mansfield,2012). These last events showed that Iran developed a geopolitical expansion with an asymmetric nature. In this perspective, Iran has been effective at a crescent like area located in Afghanistan-Iran-Lebanon region where Shiites reside (Dilek,2011). Iran try to prevent itself from Arab Spring expansion to its homeland by supporting Esad at Syrian civil war against ISIS. Iran has been developing serious strategies to cut petroleum and natural gas flow of world important energy source through its location between Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz Additionaly, as a reply to USA's treats, Iran upgraded its nuclear works from acquiring energy to uranium enrichment level (Ekinci, 2012).

There were reasons for this act. One of them was to show that Iran will not be in defensive line against the treats and the other was moving from regional to continental form of power. Yet, another one was Iran's interest and its desire to influence Mid-Asia and Middle East and use all the developments from these regions for its own benefit. Turkish view of Iran's new geopolitics can be summarized as Iran's political moves are harmful for Turkish regional and continental form of power. Turkish foreign politics biased more to Middle Eastern style. This approach aims to bring Esad regime to an end primarily and to prevent Kurdish gathering at Syria like that of Northern Iraq as well as to passivize and isolate Iran into its homeland. However, to success all these seems almost impossible and Iran became a continental power with its offensive foreign politics.

## **Conclusions**

It is evident that Iran has been transformed into regional power for a short period of time starting from year 2000 and then into a continental power with its innovative foreign politics and with its asymmetric geopolitical weapons. Foreign politics strategy based on treat was followed step by step and deliberately and this provided Iran to move in a wide perspective politically. Thus, in the presence of an adverse political movement Iran have the ability to apply effective strategies harmful for its neighbor and vicinity countries, Middle East, international countries and for Turkey. In this perspective it is important to examine outcomes of the effect of Iran to Middle East. Since Shiite crescent of Iran reaches to Lebanon, Iran supports every single political maneuver against Israel to make a continuous Israel alert. Therefore, Iran play a big role in Middle East. At recent history by 2010, Arab Spring started as an activist movement at Tunisia, followed by deposition of brutal leaders in Libya and Egypt but it is now clear that the ultimate target was Iran. But somehow the plan was blocked in Syria. This blockage has occurred by the dilemma of international community regarding to support Esad regime or not. Iran clearly declared its opposition to an intervention-operation on Syria at every single platform and continuously support this idea. Iran controls two points to keep Arab Spring out of its homeland; Northern Iraq and Syria. Both region is a buffer zone and chaos in these region is an advantageous situation for Iran. As Iran's regional strategy, Iran support PKK activities from its homeland and therefore, Turkey executes air strikes to North Iraq to stop this terrorist activities. For this reason, chaos is continuously held by Iran from Mosul-Erbil line till Turkey-Iran border region. Thus, the region is important for Iran because Iran use this uncontrolled-unstable region as a buffer zone against an enemy operation for its homeland safety. On the other side, Iran controls Middle East through Persian Gulf. It has two key advantages. The first one is its east coast including Persian Gulf belong to Iran. The other one is Shiites at Basra and Southern Iraq, even though its Iraq homeland, support Iran over Sunni pressure. By this way Iran can control every single point of Middle East. The second advantage effect was at a different perspective to international conjecture. Iran treat international society with its location on oil flow route and its nuclear power (Telatar, 2012). Iran, in spite of all oppositions and obstructions, continues to uranium enrichment via its nuclear energy to make its own nuclear weapon in a short time (Ekinci,2012) When Iran's nuclear research potential reaches to a point to design a nuclear weapon, Iran will be in so called "nuclear club countries" and will be more powerful.

Also, Iran takes precautions such as controlling Persian Gulf both from sea side and from Strait of Hormuz and control all trade activities. Iran gives a message to the whole world that it will cut the oil flow route and destroy many countries economic situation in case of an operation to Iran homeland. This means for USA to use its own strategic oil reserves to restore its energy gap and for EU to depend on a single source, Caspian region resources via Russian Federation, in terms of energy.

All these sequentially reflects on Turkey and augment the problem. Iran and Turkey are hostile to each other at Middle East, Caucasian region. Modern Turkey is a raw model for Iranians who want more freedom and this was dangerous for Iranian regime. Although Turkey is Muslim, it is Sunni and cooperates similar politics with USA, and it is political view is westernized. Further as part of NATO, it is in consensus with western countries political views both in terms of Afghanistan and Iraq invasion and political opinion against Syria. Thus, Iran is sure that Turkey will coordinate with Western for any operation against Iran.

In Turkey's perspective, Iran is dangerous in two aspects. Iran inhibits Turkey expansion to Middle East and even blocks its desire. Specially, Iran's support for Esad Syria caused Turkey to handle refugees around 400-500 thousands and its support to the idea of possible establishment of potential Kurdish region at Northern Iraq. Also, it is unacceptable for Turkey to have a neighbor who has a nuclear power at its eastern border. In summary, Iran problem is a nightmare for all western world and all possible negative situation will effect Turkey utmost. Thus, Turkey must revise its Middle East policy of expansion and must put its geopolitical expansion into a different perspective to coordinate Iran with USA and western world and finally must revise its Iran politics currently. Unless all these are performed, a permanent effect on Turkey is inevitable independent of Syrian civil war result in the next step.

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